Arab West Report Egyptian press summaries and media research for dialogue

The talk about foreign funding in Egypt for more than 10 years now had been inextricably linked to elections but what is being marketed on the mass media regarding Egypt's civil society most of the time involves inaccuracy, exaggeration and downplaying.

This text was first published in Christianity Today on January 23, 2012. Please click here for the link.

Egypt’s parliamentary elections are over.

While noting irregularities, former US president Jimmy Carter, through his Carter Center for promoting democracy, has judged the elections to be “acceptable.” When the first post-Mubarak parliament opens session today (January 23) its composition will be 72 percent Islamist.

The celebrated chant of Tahrir Square – “Muslims and Christians are one hand” – has given way to sectarian politics in which liberal parties, favored by the great majority of Copts, received a crushing defeat.

The Democratic Alliance, dominated by the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) of the Muslim Brotherhood, has won 46 percent of the seats. The more conservative Salafi Nour Party has captured 24 percent. A handful of smaller Islamist parties add another 2 percent. Liberal politicians, who were once hopeful, are reeling from their losses. Coptic Christians are left pondering their murky future.

Today, The Wall Street Journal published an op-ed article about risks to freedom that observed,

“Especially critical is protection for Copts, the canaries in Egypt's coal mine. The fate of Egypt's democracy—and the chances for the emergence of non-Islamist options—will rest on whether this millennia-old community, as well as an array of other groups, feels comfortable in the new Egypt.”

Amīn Makram ‘Ubeid, a Coptic intellectual and author, summarizes four primary Coptic responses:

- A minority, though sizeable, is planning to emigrate.

- The largest group is looking for spiritual, perhaps even mystical solutions.

- A smaller party is dedicated to stay and fight for their rights, especially in securing a non-Islamist constitution, which according to the national referendum in March is the provenance of parliament.

- Finally, there is a group that is looking to cooperate with Islamists, provided Copts do not lose their identity in the process.

Paula Majdī, a 24-year-old volunteer librarian in a Coptic Orthodox Church in Cairo, illustrates the group seeking spiritual solutions. “We pray to God to save us, but I am not afraid. Up until now we have not been sure about anything. Maybe they have won elections, but we will win the war?”

Fawzī Khalīl, a pastor at Qasr al-Dubārah Church also estimates most Christians fall into the spiritual solution category, with only about 10 percent actively participating in shaping the political outcome for Copts.

Standing their Ground

‘Imād Jād is one of the 10 percent, representing the group wishing to stay and fight. He is a Coptic leader in the liberal Egyptian Social Democratic Party, winning a parliament seat in the north Cairo district. Naturally, he offers political perspective.

“We don’t fear the result of elections because there were many violations that skewed results. In any case, parliament will not form the government, the president will, and the military council also maintains its influence.”

For him, the constitution is the largest battleground, but liberals are working on an agreement with Islamists for each party to nominate a limited number of members to the committee which will draft it.

Nevertheless, “If Islamists reach toward a Saudi-style government we have many means to resist. Certainly the new generation is able to go once again to the streets. I expect Egypt will remain a civil state.”

Father Philopater will also stay and fight, but his is a religious perspective. A controversial priest in the Coptic Orthodox Church who has repeatedly clashed with the hierarchy, Philopater expects a continuation of the suffering of Copts.

“The one benefit is that persecution will now be obvious, as under Mubarak it was always assigned to hidden hands or deviant people.”

Furthermore, Copts should not cooperate with Islamists. ‘It is true some speak of protecting Copts, but others speak about jiziah, call us infidels, or instruct Muslims not to greet us in the street.’

‘Ubeid agrees with non-cooperation. “Christians should not support them in their quest for power. If we sell ourselves, why should liberal Muslims continue to fight?”

Cooperating with Islamists

Then there is the group which promotes cooperation. Rafīq Habīb, son of a now-deceased prominent Protestant pastor, represents a tiny Coptic constituency that actually favors Islamist rule. He is among roughly one hundred Copts who are founding members of the Brotherhood’s FJP, and serves as one of its vice-presidents.

He believes Egypt must accept the essential religious basis of society, not deny it.

“Secularism surrounds Christianity and the church and weakens its role in society. Under an Islamic state it can be completely different because the main function of the Islamic state is to protect religion, not to restrict it.”

More typical are Copts who wish to cooperate with Islamists but due to necessity. Among these is Yūsif Sidhom, editor-in-chief of the Coptic newspaper Watani.

“In order to keep any vicious Islamist appetite at bay we must stay at the table with them and remind them they promised not to hijack Egypt.”

Unlike Philopater, Sidhom has a degree of trust in the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, who through his interactions with them finds them to be decent people.

“I believe the Brotherhood wants to prove they can create a form of democracy that respects the rights of all Egyptians.”

Similar to Social Democrat Jād, however, Sidhom is prepared.

“Our Plan B if Islamist groups seek an Islamic state is to oppose their constitution in a referendum, but if it is accepted, Copts and liberal Muslims – 40 percent of the population – will take again to the streets.”

All Politics is Local

While these responses are varied, it is “the street” that decides. This is not the street of Tahrir Square, but the poor, crowded neighborhoods in every city of Egypt.

In Warrāq, a suburb of Cairo, Shādia Bushra, a 45 year old Coptic widow, cast her vote for the Freedom and Justice Party.

“I don’t know much about politics, but I followed the general view of the neighborhood.”
It did not hurt that when her local church failed to intervene to defend her rights in a property dispute,

‘Isām Sharīf, her Salafi neighbor and a leader in the Nour Party stood by her side, retained a lawyer, and helped win the judgment against wealthier Christian neighbors.

“I told her I would have done the same if she was opposed by Muslims,” stated Sharīf.

Stated Islamist commitment to the rights of all has also won support from Copts in Maghāghah, a small city in Upper Egypt. Sheikh Hamdī ‘Abd al-Fattāh is a candidate for the Nour Party.

“I will consider myself the candidate of Christians ahead of Muslims, even if they do not vote for me. As such, I have to demand their rights. This is both democracy and Sharī’ah law.”

Father Yu’annis is a Coptic Orthodox priest in Maghāghah and has campaigned openly for ‘Abd al-Fattāh.

“I don’t support him as a Salafi or as a Muslim, but as a person. He is from our village and I hope all Salafis will be like him.”

Yet he is pragmatic as well. “If we see more than two-thirds of the people are for an Islamic state we cannot stop them from having it, so as the Egyptian proverb says, ’With him who wins, play with him’. I must do my village duty to stand by him, so he won’t say I caused him to lose, and if he wins, he will be thankful.”

Perplexing Questions

The seismic politic changes in Egypt during the past 12 months are still underway. Copts and others fill this resulting uncertainty with fears and expectations in wildly different directions.

‘Isām Thābit, a Coptic school teacher in Maghāghah, believes all will be well. “Whoever comes to power will make sure they treat Christians better than the old regime, even though they know Christians won’t vote for them. I expect many churches to be built.”

His Coptic colleague Yāsir Tekla from the neighboring city of Benī Mazār expects, and oddly welcomes, the worst. “I will vote for the Salafis now so they will come to power and people will see them truly, and then reject them afterwards.”

Many Copts hesitated during the revolution, while others joined wholeheartedly. The initial celebrations of Tahrir – where Muslims and Christians alternated protecting each other at prayer – have been followed by multiple instances of bloody sectarian conflict.

This has prompted Copts to ask themselves hard questions: Should Copts take refuge in the military council against Islamists, or with Islamists against the military-as-old-regime? Should they enter the political arena and trust its processes, or enter their churches and trust in God?

So far, clear answers to these questions seem beyond the reach of Egypt’s Christian minority.

Salafi politics has taken Egypt by storm. This has surprised many commentators who underestimated their base of thought and non-political nature. For others, it has been a validation of years of Salafi work in mosques and surrounding communities to preach Islam and help the poor.

As an aid to understanding this phenomenon, and in effort to understand it myself, this text will function as an inverted pyramid. It will start with broad strokes concerning the Salafi coalition in Egypt – the Nour Party, focus on one member in particular – the Asala Party, demonstrate their base in a typical neighborhood – Warrāq, and then feature one member in particular – ‘Isām al-Sharīf. Appreciation is given for his help in gathering the story which follows.

Salafis in Egypt began to emerge in the late 1970s in Alexandria, in response to Muslim Brotherhood domination of Islamist activism there. Finding fault with their political mobilization and ideology, Salafis organized the ‘Salafi Call’ organization in 1985, evolving from the decades old ‘Association of Those Who Promote the Sunnah’. This grouping was very apolitical, but after the revolution produced the Nour Party which competed over parliamentary seats.

Yet until the revolution, Salafis preferred social work to politics, especially under the conditions of Mubārak. Their leaders were confined to Alexandria, not being able to leave without a security permit. Instead they focused on educational establishments, literature, and committee work to distribute zakat, to work with youth, and to promote their brand of Islam throughout Egypt.

Though lines overlap, Salafis can be distinguished from Muslim Brothers and Islamic revolutionaries based on methodology, rather than thought. All three groups desire some sort of an Islamic state in which sharī‘ah law is the basis of governance. After a history of struggle against the state, the Muslim Brotherhood foreswore violence and sought to transform society while seeking entrance into the political arena. Believing the Brotherhood to have betrayed the jihadist struggle, revolutionary groups such as al-Jamā’ah al-Islāmīyyah continued to agitate against the state, seeking its overthrow.

Salafis, meanwhile, are understood to be quietist. They eschewed political participation, with some, perhaps many, declaring it to be heretical to Islamic law. At the same time their theology called for obedience to a Muslim ruler. Unlike many in the revolutionary groups, Salafis accepted the broad, liberal, and traditional interpretation of ‘Muslim ruler’, accepting Mubārak as having been given by God.

Therefore, while the state pounded revolutionary Islamic groups out of existence in the 1990s and early 2000s, and placed countless political obstacles and jail terms in the path of the Muslim Brotherhood, Mubārak generally allowed Salafis free reign to propagate their religious interpretations. While strict limits were enforced, Salafi preaching proliferated in the mosques of lower class areas as well as on popular satellite television channels. Rumors are rife concerning extensive financial support from conservative Gulf nations, but the result was the emergence – below the attention of middle class society and politics – of an authentic Egyptian Salafi movement.

Conventional wisdom states given their unique situation in the Egyptian scene, Salafis did not join the revolution of January 25. By and large this is true; many of their leaders declared such activity as religiously harām. Yet many Salafis did participate, following the non-Salafis initiation. This is the testimony of Hānī Fawzī, a political activist from Helwan and party leader for the Salafi Asala Party in Nasr City, Cairo. He joined the demonstrations on January 28, as did a few of his favored Salafi sheikhs, such as Nashat Ahmad, Hasan Abū al-Ishbāl, Fawzī al-Sayyid, and lastly Muhammad ‘Abd al-Maqsūd Afīfī, who will be mentioned later.

Nevertheless, upon the success of the revolution and the opening of the political scene, many Egyptian political analysts were surprised to see the enthusiastic participation of newly formed Salafi parties. This was accompanied by much internal discord. Some continued to criticize political participation, and those who formed parties witnessed several divisions and splits. In the end, two main groupings emerged.

The first and largest issued from Alexandria, understood to be the greatest base of Salafi strength. Leaders there created the Nour (Light) Party. Meanwhile in Cairo, the Asala (Origin) Party was formed. Other parties also emerged, but did not come to national prominence. Nour and Asala were not true rivals, however. One Salafi stated the reason to have more than one party was pragmatic. If any difficulties were encountered by one party – political, legal, administrative – the other one could assure representation.

Over the summer Egypt’s political powers negotiated alliances as the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party seized the place of initiative. They created the ‘Democratic Alliance’, seeking as broad a coalition as possible. The historic liberal party, the Wafd, joined them, as did the newly created Salafi entities. Newer liberal parties rejected the central place of the Brotherhood and doubted their democratic credentials. The Free Egyptians and the Social Democratic Party allied instead with the youth revolutionary parties, setting up a liberal vs. Islamist electoral battle.

Yet further splintering emerged. The revolutionary parties split from what became known as the Egyptian Bloc, largely over issues of representation and nomination of members. Meanwhile, the Wafd Party decided the Brotherhood-dominated Democratic Alliance did not fit with its liberal heritage, and decided to go it alone in elections.

The surprise came when the Salafis later split from the Brotherhood, although the reason is similar to that which decreased participation in the Egyptian Bloc. Egypt’s electoral system created a two-thirds ‘party list’ and a one-third ‘individual’ competition for seats. In the party list system, a slate of candidates would be presented, to be voted on as a whole. The number of candidates elected would correspond to the percentage of the vote captured by the list within a particular district. For individual seats, only one person could be nominated and receive support from the coalition.

In the Egyptian Bloc, youthful revolutionaries and established middle-class professionals vied for positioning at the top of the list, and for nomination in individual elections. When the youth felt they were being marginalized, they formed their own coalition. It should be mentioned additionally that leftist-liberal orientation played a role in their division, though it did not take down the alliance. The remaining Free Egyptian Party (right of center economically) and Social Democratic Party (left of center) held together in support of a liberal political system, and perhaps in opposition to Islamist trends.

The story is similar for the Democratic Alliance. The largely middle-class and politically established Muslim Brotherhood clashed with the lower-class and populist Salafis over representation in the coalition. It should be mentioned additionally that moderate-conservative orientation also played a role. Yet rather than this designation, it might be truer to label the conflict as pragmatic versus idealistic. In any case, the Salafi parties left and created a coalition under the name of their dominant partner, the Nour Party.

This coalition included the Reform and Development Party, created since the revolution by al-Jamā’ah al-Islāmīyyah, the former Islamic revolutionaries. After being greatly weakened by the state, the group controversially foreswore violence in the late 1990s. Laboring internally over their identity and purpose, al-Jamā’ah maintained a base of support in Upper Egypt, and allied with the Salafis during the elections.

The other partner with Nour is the aforementioned Asala Party, to which the rest of this essay will turn. This largely geographical alliance – Alexandria, Cairo, Upper Egypt – gave the Salafis a national base of support, allowing each partner to draw from their positions of strength. The result has been a solid 25% of the national vote. The Muslim Brotherhood drew support from many Egyptians for its role as major opposition party to Mubārak, as well as a lack of alternatives, and not necessarily from its Islamist politics. Salafis, meanwhile, drew only from their base and their religious-identity based campaign strategy, suggesting their representation does indeed encompass one in four Egyptians.

Yet before moving on in complete acceptance of this fact, it is suspected by many the Salafis also received the benefit of official fraud. If this accusation is true, it does not necessarily imply their complicity. Rather, it is maintained the ‘old regime’ remnants in the state wish to prop up the Salafis for one of two reasons. First, given their political acquiescence to the stability of order, otherwise non-Salafi political apparatchiks and business interests believe they can rule through the Salafis and maintain a Mubārak-style regime. They would allow Salafis to institute a more conservative social order, but themselves exist outside of its reach. The assumed political naiveté of Salafis would also allow the same level of corruption in administration and policing.

The second reason proposed for state-sponsorship of the Salafis is that they are meant as a counter-balance to the Muslim Brotherhood. It is maintained the Brotherhood could not be denied leadership in the post-revolutionary order, but they are pragmatic enough to play political games. Mubārak scared the West by saying support me, or face the Brotherhood. Old regime members can now make back-door deals with the pro-business Brotherhood to say, support us, or face the Salafis. Meanwhile, to keep the Brotherhood honest, the old regime can threaten them with the populist Salafis, who can ‘out-Islam them’ if push comes to shove, especially if the state greases the wheels of low-level electoral fraud. Either way, it is a dangerous game, but many liberals believe it is being played, if only from sour grapes.

Shifting focus to the Asala Party in particular, it is interesting to note it was not the first Salafi Party formed in Cairo. This honor goes to the Fadila (Virtue) Party. According to reports, the co-founder of the Fadila Party, Khālid al-Sa’īd, had disagreements with elected chairman ‘Adel ‘Abd al-Maqsūd Afīfī, resulting in the parting of their ways. The latter then went on to found the Asala Party.

Afīfī had been a general in the police force# and the director of the Passports and Immigration Control section of the Interior Ministry. He is also noteworthy for being the brother of the celebrated Salafi television preacher Muhammad ‘Abd al-Maqsūd Afīfī, who also served as a government chemist. His Egyptian ministry is based in Shubra, a neighborhood in the north of Cairo.

Afīfī was elected president of the party, which he co-founded with Ehāb Shīhah, an engineer who owns a mid-level building company. Shīhah is vice-president of the party, along with Mamdūh Isma’īl, a lawyer renowned for handing the defense of Islamist clients, especially from al-Jamā’ah al-Islāmīyyah.

The Asala Party literature declares it to possess ‘a contemporary vision of original principles’. This vision consists of six founding principles which influence eight goals in particular.

Founding Principles

• Islamic sharī‘ah law is the principle source for legislation, which guarantees justice for all denominations of the people.
• The national benefit will be promoted through the search for professionals of high capability and sincerity to work in government.
• The Egyptian people have the right to personal freedom of expression, and the Egyptian citizens must have their respect and dignity protected.
• The Egyptian people have the right to choose their representatives in both legislative councils and executive bodies.
• Elected representatives are chosen by the people to express their viewpoints, not to be considered better than them.
• The ruling authorities – president of the republic and the cabinet ministers – are employees who work for the good of the people, who have the right to question, hold accountable, and judge them if they perform poorly.

Party Goals

• Intellectual, social, and moral development through purifying souls and the elevation of traditional values drawn from Islamic sharī‘ah law.
• Complete economic renaissance in all sectors of the state resulting in an increase in GDP through ideal use of national resources.
• Just distribution of wealth and lessening the class divisions to improve the social situation of the general Egyptian people.
• Preserving the dignity of the Egyptian citizen, whether inside or outside of Egypt, without looking to his social position, as the simple citizen is the primary member of society.
• Complete improvement in social services necessary for the public, including educational, health, and security.
• Establishing the foundation of justice and equality between citizens in their rights and the rule of law, through implementing Article Two of the constitution to ensure the regulations of Islamic sharī‘ah are the true and veritable primary source of legislation.
• Crafting strong relations with neighboring countries, especially of the Nile Basin to preserve the interests of Egypt both domestically and internationally.
• The return of Egypt to her position of leadership in the region, in Africa, and among Islamic nations, as deserving of her history, civilization, and the potential of her great people.

The Asala Party then went about the work of building party infrastructure. They chose Essam al-Sharīf as party secretary for Warrāq, a neighborhood in north-west Cairo. Warrāq is a mixed industrial-agricultural area, lower class, with Christians interspersed throughout the neighborhoods. There are several churches, one of which is alleged to have received an appearance of the Virgin Mary in December 2009. The name of the area is derived from the Arabic for ‘maker of paper’. As such, it hosted papyrus manufacture from ancient days as well as the first modern printing press in Egypt. It is also well known for production of women’s Islamic dress.

During elections, Warrāq constituted a district along with the neighboring areas of ‘Awsīm and Manāshi. The district was allotted ten seats for party-list competition. The Muslim Brotherhood backed Freedom and Justice Party captured 40% of the vote, while the Nour Party alliance received 30%, capturing three seats. Two of these three – ‘Adel Azayzī and Abū Khadrah – are from the Nour Party proper, while the third – Nazzār Ghurāb – represented the Reform and Development Party of al-Jamā’ah al-Islāmīyyah. The Asala Party did not field a candidate in this district, but campaigned for its partners all the same.

The campaign for individual candidates followed national law to vote for one seat for ‘professionals’, and another for ‘workers/farmers’. This peculiarity is a holdover from Nāsir-era elections designed to assure better representation for the working class in his socialist system. Over a hundred candidates campaigned, but only a few had enough prominence to secure victory.

One major issue for parties was the dominance of Mubārak’s National Party in all constituencies of Egypt. This did not concern the professionals’ seat, in which Mahmoud ‘Amir of the Freedom and Justice Party defeated ‘Imād al-Halabī from Nour in the run-off election. This was a friendly competition in which the two candidates shook hands after the final result was declared. On the street however, the FJP candidate received the vote of a Salafi partisan, angering some within Asala. Many commentators expect a replication in the years to come. The Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis are ideologically similar, yet competition often brings out the worst in men, even among friends.

Yet the problems of candidacy with the old regime National Party complicated the workers’/farmers’ election. Newer parties were under pressure not to nominate any Mubārak era figures, but this eliminated so many potential candidates. In the end, both the FJP and the Nour Party selected individuals, but their applications were rejected legally for not meeting worker/farmer qualifications. As such, Islamist forces failed to feature a candidate for this Warrāq slot.

Even so, they represented a major voting constituency, desired by other candidates. In the initial election neither the FJP nor the Salafis endorsed a candidate. The run-off resulted in the easy victory of Mustafa Sulimān, an independent candidate, over Yūsuf Khālid of the Egyptian Bloc. Sharīf explained both candidates had ties to the National Party, though neither occupied significant leadership. To play in politics under Mubārak meant getting your hands dirty in the party; Sharīf believed Khālid’s hands were dirtier. Islamists threw their weight behind Sulimān in the run-off, which was decisive.

One of the more prominent campaign tactics of the Nour Party coalition was widely criticized by other parties. Outside the party headquarters of Asala a pickup truck would arrive several times weekly, stocked with gas bottles. These are needed by the majority of residents as the state does not provide independent gas lines into each home. Due to a purported shortage in supply the black market drove up rates, yet the Asala Party sold each at the designated government price. It was assumed there was either money from the Gulf funding this program, or else government corruption to facilitate it.

Sharīf explained there was indeed corruption, but that the Asala Party was combating it. The offices of the local governor would authorize certain people as agents, sell them bottles for 3LE ($0.50 US), and allow them to resell at 5LE ($0.80 US). Instead, due to shortages, bottles were being sold for as much as 20-25LE ($3.25 - $4 US). In many parts of Egypt there were protests over these shortages, with the poor bearing the brunt of others’ profit.

The Nour Party coalition went to the governor and threatened to bring him up on charges of corruption if this process did not cease. They then arranged directly with the agent at the point of loading, paying him his due price, and directing the pick-up truck to party neighborhoods in each district. There, to gathered crowds, party coordinators would sell the bottles at price, plus 1LE markup for transportation. According to Sharīf, there was neither profit nor expense for the party. There was, however, great popular acclaim. When one recipient entered the party offices and asked who to vote for, Sharīf stated (at least in the presence of the author), ‘Whoever you want.’ Upon insistence, he said the Nour Party is good. Asked about the Brotherhood, he said they were good also.

This program could have been done by any party, Sharīf explained, but the success of the Salafis stems from their connection to the people. Sharīf is a son of Warrāq; he is a local businessman who owns a coffee bean shop. He is not wealthy, but is able to travel to Sudan on business to import supplies. Furthermore, he works for the Asala Party on a volunteer basis. He believes in his principles, and sacrifices for them.

As an example of sacrifice, connection to the people, but not fanaticism to the party, Sharīf offered his intervention on behalf of his Christian neighbor. Shādia Būshra is a 45 year old widow, living in an apartment complex owned by her extended family. When her aunt decided to move to a more affluent quarter, she attempted to sell the building. Shādia, however, refused to leave. She was paying 10LE ($1.80 US) monthly rent for years, and a now grandfathered housing law dictated the freezing of the original rental contract. If Shādia moved she would have to find a new apartment at current market prices, which would overwhelm her and her three children. Shādia earned around 300LE ($55 US) per month working in a local nursery, and received a 120LE ($20 US) monthly stipend from the government as a widow.

Shādia’s aunt could have sold the building without forcing the move, but this would have resulted in a lower sale price, as the new owner would be legally obligated to honor the original rental agreement. Shādia, however, had long lost the original contract, and her aunt decided to take her to court.

Having been neighbors for many years, Sharīf helped Shādia when a priest in the local church took the side of the wealthy relatives. He went with her multiple times to the court, and bore witness she was a long standing resident of the apartment. The judge ruled in her favor, and she is now the sole resident in an empty apartment building.

Shādia asked Sharīf if he would have helped her had the litigant been a Muslim. Sharīf answered he only became involved because she bore the side of right, and was acting on behalf of a neighbor. Shādia wound up voting for the Freedom and Justice Party of the Muslim Brotherhood, following the general word on the street. She gave no indication Sherif influenced her to vote in any direction.

Egypt is learning the ways of democracy, yet within a historic struggle for power. Part of the acclaim of Islamist parties is they represent a departure from the ways of corruption in the former regime, bound, as they are, by the moral strictures of Islam. Whether they will prove incorruptible is subject to much doubt, and though Sharīf’s explanation of the gas bottle campaigning is reasonable, it also seems to skirt the line of the acceptable.

Yet Sharīf displays a magnanimity and sincerity bearing well on his party. Its principles and goals may be another matter, requiring further analysis. Whether or not an open-minded, reasonable personality like Sharīf is representative of his party is yet another question. To what degree are Salafis other-rejecting extremists, and to what degree are they simply portrayed this way in liberal propaganda, which has rarely descended to learn from or benefit the street?

Answers to these questions will require the wisdom of the years to come, yet requires immediate action in electoral decisions. Salafis are part and parcel of Egypt; their place is demanded in representation. How Egyptians decide – or are manipulated – is subject to debate; this small window into their world is offered simply as a means to understanding.

Shaykh Hamdī ‘Abd al-Fattāh is a unique personality in Egypt. Little known outside of his home region of Maghagha in Upper Egypt, he is a candidate for parliament running under the banner of the Salafi Nour Party. In and of itself, there is nothing unusual here – the Nour Party has searched for and nominated local popular candidates throughout Egypt. What is unique is that Shaykh Hamdī has the endorsement of the local Coptic Orthodox priest of his village, Fr. Yu’annis.

This interview discusses why Shaykh Hamdī has received Coptic support, but also explores his understanding of the application of sharia law in the modern world. Shaykh Hamdī is eager to correct common misperceptions, but, perhaps unwittingly, confirms others. Topics include tourism, war booty, jiziah, dress, legislation, and the legality of democracy.

Shaykh Hamdī is an engaging and friendly person. He was sincere and believable, and I trust he will work on behalf of the Copts, as he promises. At the same time it was a challenging interview, as getting him to answer intended questions proved difficult. Whether this was due to language issues, culture and worldview differences, or political doublespeak is hard to say. Nonetheless, Shaykh Hamdī provides an insightful view into the mindset of a modern day Salafi, both confirming and undoing typical stereotypes.

As a final note, Shaykh Hamdī lost his electoral race. After stage one he finished in second place behind the candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood, and thus qualified for the run-off. Though he lost the run-off, the judge ruled to nullify the result, given the level of fraud witnessed on behalf of his competition. Shaykh Hamdī stated there were 40,000 additional votes cast illegally for his opponent. Nevertheless, rather than a second run-off, the ruling was issued simply to accept the results of the first round voting. Shaykh Hamdī replied, ‘It is God’s will,’ and refused to be angry. Still, he holds out hope for a reversal.

JC: Please introduce yourself to us.

HAF: My name is ‘Alaa’ al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Fattāh Muhammad, but I am known by the name of Shaykh Hamdī ‘Abd al-Fattāh. I have a general institute for the calling of people to religion. I worked thirteen years in Saudi Arabia as an imam, mosque lecturer, and teacher of the Qur’an. I am a member of the Maghāghah Reconciliation Committee which works according to traditional regulations.

I joined the Salafi Nour Party immediately after it was established, and presented myself as a candidate to which they agreed. I did this after reading their platform which I determined to be moderate. It is comprehensive and without fanaticism toward anyone. Among its priorities is the call to implement sharī‘ah law, but it emphasizes to do this gradually.

Among the accusations against the Nour Party is that it will prevent tourism, but this is not logical. On the contrary, our program is very powerful. If you compare Egypt, with all its civilization and history, Jordan, Turkey, and Malaysia all have higher tourist incomes. This is because we rely on luxury tourism only. We can boost conference tourism, which not only can bring more money that luxury tourism, it also profits the nation scientifically as doctors and professors bring knowledge in addition to money spent on airfare, hotels, clubs, and general expenses.

There is also medical tourism. We should build world-class hospitals that will draw the majority of medical travelers from the Gulf and from Africa, rather than them going to America or France, where the costs are very high. Here, we have the medical proficiency and lower costs. This will again raise our scientific benefit as well as financial from airfare and hotels, as before.

Yes, we will also promote luxury tourism, but only that which is religiously legitimate. It is not necessary to mix the sexes on the beach. We have many unmarried young men. When they view these mixed settings the result can be one of sin. What is the problem with establishing some family-only or single-sex chalets, where you can enjoy yourself freely without temptation? Turkey has done this, for example. Should there not be freedom for this, is this not respect for freedom? You might say we should be open-minded, but I reply I don’t want anyone to see my wife. So as you call for freedom for the other, I also call for the freedom to keep my wife from being seen.

JC: Would you also allow for beaches where people wish to mix with the other sexes?

HAF: Exactly. But I know from tourists they wish to inquire about the customs of the country in which they are visiting. But are we forgetting about the tourists from the Gulf when we concentrate on Europe? Gulf countries have more tourists, and Egypt is the closest country to them. Right now, they are going to Turkey.

Then, another issue concerns the Copts. What is their status under sharī‘ah law?

JC: This is a very important topic and we will approach it soon, but let’s return to you as a person. You are from the village of Qufādah, and friends with Fr. Yu’annis. You are also a shaykh, but was does this mean? How did you become a shaykh? Are you an Azhar graduate?

HAF:  No, I have a diploma from the High Institute for Calling which is a private center attached to the Religious Legitimacy Association of Egypt.

JC: What do you do in Maghāghah, what is your job?

HAF: I am a real estate agent, buying and selling buildings, apartments, shops, etc.

JC: Do you preach in the mosque?

HAF: Yes, but not in one in particular. I preach often both in Qufādah and outside.

JC: Here in Qufādah, you are good friends with Fr. Yu’annis.

HAF: Yes, Muslim-Christian relations here in the village are very strong. It is friendship, not just greeting each other in the streets. If there are problems, even between two Christians, we come to the church to help solve them.

JC: You are speaking of your work with the reconciliation committee. Tell me more about that.

HAF: In most instances the reconciliation committee is able to solve problems faster than the legal system. It takes only one session, and the decision is binding on both parties. We search for the truth, no matter who it is with.

Every day we sit to solve problems between Muslims. Often we sit to solve problems between Christians. But what happens is when there is a problem between a Muslim and a Christian the media twists the issue somewhat to become a religious matter. They take refuge in religious chauvinism and turn it from a personal struggle into a religious one. There are occasions where a Muslim boy and girl will make an improper relationship, and the same with Christians. But if it happens between religions, we must treat it with reason and wisdom in the same manner we would otherwise. We don’t accept any religious chauvinism in either direction.

JC: One of the benefits of the reconciliation is that it is fast.

HAF: Yes, court cases can take years. This is one of the problems our party wishes to address.

JC: But what if the issue is criminal, especially if blood is shed?

HAF: In our religion we must confront strife before it grows, and shedding blood is among the worst things for us. Our prophet said, in his farewell address during the pilgrimage, your blood, your money, and your honor are sacred to you. Is this just for Muslims? No, it is for anyone of religion, whether Christian, or Jewish, or Buddhist. Blood may not be shed except by right, such as in punishing murder.

JC: But is there a verse in the Qur’an that permits the taking of female prisoners during war?

HAF: Yes, this is present in sharī‘ah law, and was part of Arab tradition before Islam. In war, it was permitted to take as booty money, horses, sheep, camels, men, and women. If a woman was taken she became a female slave. But does this exist today? No, it was a description of the culture that was present in its day. Today, there is no jihad.

JC: But if it returns?

HAF: When will jihad return? If a nation attacks America, will it not respond militarily? It is not permitted for Muslims to announce jihad unless their lands or honor are violated. If they are not attacked, they will not attack others.

JC: So this would apply in Palestine, where their lands have been taken?

HAF: Yes, it is permitted for Muslims to respond in the manner of which they have been violated. If he destroys my house, I will not stomach this, I will destroy his house. But I may not destroy two houses. If you attack me, I have the right of defense. This is even international law.

JC: So, in application of sharī‘ah as Muhammad permitted in his era, is it allowed for their women to be taken as the spoils of war?

HAF: Is Israel a democratic country? No, it is a Torah-governed country. Why then does the world protest if I say I want an Islamic state which implements sharī‘ah law? If jihad is made mandatory and our women are taken, it is permissible to take them in kind, but it is not necessary. In sharī‘ah we have what is called ‘exchange’. If there is a prisoner taken he can be swapped, and this is what happened in the period of ibn Taymiyyah.

There were many battles in his day with Christians, and the Christian forces took both Muslim and Christian prisoners. Ibn Taymiyyah went to the Christian king and asked for the prisoners to be returned, and the king told him to take the Muslims. Ibn Taymiyyah refused, saying the Christians are under our protection. I will not take a Muslim and leave the Christians behind, but insist on taking the Christian prisoners first.

Or consider when ‘Amr ibn al-‘As entered Egypt. Christians were under the most horrible situation during this time under the Romans, to the extent the patriarch went into hiding. Who protected him? ‘Amr ibn al-‘As. He made a pact with him and guaranteed his safety.

JC: This reminds me of a question: Why did the Muslims stay in Egypt and not return to their lands after defending the Copts?

HAF: This is what the families of Egypt wanted. Why? The Copts at that time were under severe persecution. They requested the Muslims to stay, since this represented security for them from the Romans.

The proof? One day, when the son of ‘Amr ibn al-‘As was horseracing with a Christian, the Christian spat on him. In response he hit the Christian and said, ‘Will you spit on the son of the most noble?’ The Christian then lodged a complaint with Caliph ‘Umar ibn al-Khattāb in Medina, who summoned not just the son, but his father as well. The Caliph asked the Christian if this was the one who hit him, and he ordered the Christian to hit him in return, which he did. Then the Caliph said, ‘Now, hit the most noble one also,’ referring to ‘Amr ibn al-‘As, who at that time was the ruler of Egypt. You see that Islam does not permit oppression for anyone, whether ruler or ruled.

The caliph then sent the Christian away and asked ‘Amr, do you not take from him the jiziah? Will you take it from him while he is strong and then leave him weak that he has to beg in the streets? Give him a salary from the public funds of the Muslims.

Today, many Copts feel that jiziah is a form of contempt or shame. But does he not pay taxes? Fine, we will cancel the word jiziah, and call it taxes. We’ll say, ‘Pay your taxes, and what will you get in return? No one will attack you in your worship, or your doctrine, or your homes, or your persons, or your money, or your honor. You will have complete security, and have your protection guaranteed. If you don’t want to enter the army, you won’t have to.’

JC: Will it be permitted for him to serve in the army?

HAF: Yes.

JC: Will this be in replacement of jiziah?

HAF: No, jiziah will still be taken, but if you want to enter the army, go ahead, and even so I am committed to your protection.

JC: So if the Salafis gain control of government in Egypt, what will you do with jiziah?

HAF: Let’s talk first about the perspective of Muslims toward Christians if the sharī‘ah is implemented. We will treat them with righteousness, respect, friendship, and justice. In terms of rights, everyone will be the same. There will be no difference between a Muslim and a Christian. In terms of their family affairs – marriage, divorce, inheritance – we will not apply sharī‘ah here but they can judge themselves.

JC: What rights will they have exactly?

HAF: They will have all rights. The prophet said, ‘What is for them is for us,’ which means, if I can take salary, or gain positions, or have houses, or …, in everything that has to do with putting together a government there is no difference between Muslim or Christian.

JC: Even the high positions in government?

HAF: Yes, and there will be equivalence in their salaries as well.

Is there a constitution today that guarantees the rights of minorities like the sharī‘ah law? No. They are ahl al-dhimmah, under our protection. They have rights over us and we have responsibilities toward them. As long as they don’t kill me, or raise a weapon against me, or attack me, I am obliged to protect them and give security to them and their houses of worship as well.

JC: But does not this designation as ahl al-dhimmah raise the status of the Muslim over that of the Christian?

HAF: No, but the opposite. They will be more comfortable than the Muslims.

JC: Yes, maybe he is comfortable, but is he equal?

HAF: Let’s look at a Muslim and a Christian student. If the Christian scores higher on his marks, is it right for me to appoint the Muslim to a position over him? No.

JC: Is there a verse that says, ‘Do not take them [Jews and Christians] as friends/guardians? (Qur’an 5:51)

HAF: This is not speaking about Christians, so to speak. Of Christians it says, ‘You will find the nearest of them in affection to the believers those who say, "We are Christians."’ (Quran 5:82)

But the most difficult religion, which hates all of humanity, is that of the Jews. They hate Christianity also. In Palestine, do they make any difference between Muslim and Christian? No, they will kill them both.

So the Jewish religion has the most hate for humanity, but as for Christianity, there is friendship, ‘because among them are priests and monks and because they are not arrogant’ (continuing verse above).

JC: To be sure I have not memorized the verse, but people tell me that the one I mentioned warns Muslims from allowing Christians to take positions above them.

HAF: This does not intend Christians in particular. But let me ask you a question: Did you know that in Britain there is a law preventing the prime minister from being other than a Protestant [Anglican]? Why? The majority is Protestant, so the prime minister must also be Protestant. So if we have a nation where the majority is Muslim, what should we expect the ruler to be?

JC: The issue of the ruler is one thing, but that of positions in society is another. What is intended by the word ‘guardians’ in that verse?

HAF: Guardianship is that of which you lean on for support, or to which you hand over your affairs. But it does not mean the one who is with you, it speaks of the foreigner.

There is domestic politics, and there is international politics. It is not possible that I give the guardianship to someone outside – a Jew, for example. Or let’s speak about American support. Will America give funds and let you spend them as you wish? Or will they demand conditions and severe restrictions?

JC: Sure, you should not accept the money in the first place.

HAF: Right, and in truth, we are not a poor country. There has been a study showing the sand of Sinai is among the best quality in the world for the production of glass? Erdogan, the Turkish prime minister, when he visited Egypt said all he did was to close the faucets of corruption. In terms of Africa we are the number one producer of natural gas, and eighth in terms of the world.

JC: Very good, so you refuse the guardianship of foreign powers, but domestically – can a Copt head a ministry? Can he run a company? Can he be a school principal?

HAF: What is the problem with any of this? As long as he has the qualifications, why not?

Did you know that our educational policy in Egypt is a complete failure? That is why in our party we will work on developing education. Statistics show the most intelligent children in the world are Egyptian. But as soon as he enters school he becomes the stupidest student in the world.

JC: Allow me to move to a different subject. I live here and I know the genius of the Egyptian people (both laughing). Something that is not known, though, is your commitment to the values of democracy. Some of your shaykhs speak of it as something foreign, imported, and not Islamic.

HAF: What does the word ‘democracy’ mean? It is that a people are ruled by the people. But if there is a heavenly law…? Here’s a question: If you have an appliance, like a TV, will you turn to the agent or just some person when it needs fixing? The agent, of course, since he knows the appliance.

So if God created humanity, he knows what is good for it, and what will keep it from corruption. This is why he gave his law.

JC: In terms of faith, this is fine. But what in terms of democracy?

HAF: You will not find democracy or freedom greater than what is found in the sharī‘ah. We say you are free as long as you do no harm. There are three types of harm: to doctrine, to public property, and to private property. Does freedom give one the right to transgress on the will of others?

JC: What happens if the majority does not desire the rule of sharī‘ah?

HAF: Some people say the Salafis will cut of hands (of thieves). This is correct, but at the same time, it is wrong. If your hand is to be cut off, you must first be offered five things: work, a living wage, a home, a wife, and a means of transportation. If you have all five, and you still transgress against the property of others, what do you deserve?

JC: I understand your logic, but you are justifying why the sharī‘ah is good. It is one thing if people choose it now, but what if they change their mind later? Or what if you fail in your policies? Can the people then choose against you?

HAF: Of course, we accept this. If we feel we are not able to perform our duty for the people, we will resign. We are not seeking parliament seats for pride. These are seats of service.

Some in the former ruling party used their seats to grant favors and enjoy immunity. We want to take away this immunity from members of parliament, as pertains to affairs outside parliament. We will work as any other citizen.

JC: Has not one of the Salafi shaykhs declared democracy to be unbelief?

HAF: This is Eng. ‘Abd al-Mun’im al-Shahāt. What does he mean by unbelief? It is what we have been talking about. But the media exaggerates this issue, calling him the official spokesman of the party. He is not; there are two: Dr. Nāder Bakār and Dr. Yusrī Hammād. He is simply a candidate.

But what did he mean by democracy and unbelief? Is democracy the rule of the people by the people? No, for us ruling is only for God.

JC: Let us suppose you and the Muslim Brotherhood make an alliance in parliament. You will be able to create the laws you wish. After the term is over, following six years, you will allow for the people to choose once again, even for other parties?

HAF: Yes. Let us speak of the president. We want to put conditions on the position so we don’t have a return of dictatorship. We must make sure the parliament does not become subservient to the president. The parliament must hold the president accountable, not the other way around.

JC: So in parliament, who decides if a law is consistent with or contrary to the sharī‘ah?

HAF: The sharī‘ah functions as does the constitution. So any law must move in accordance with the constitution, just as it must with sharī‘ah.

JC: So taking an example: Must a woman cover with the hijāb, the niqāb, or is she free to wear what she wants?

HAF: Nothing religious will be imposed on anyone. We will advise only, and the one who refuses is free.

JC: Are there differences among Muslims as to what sharī‘ah is exactly?

HAF: No, not as concerns the roots of sharī‘ah, all are in agreement.

JC: What about new interpretations, consistent with the modern era?

HAF: This has to do with the details, not with the roots.

JC: Or, what if a Muslim interprets concerning bank interest. Might one say that the regulations of sharī‘ah were good for their era, but argue that today such policy is allowed?

HAF: We will work with the banks gradually. Most banks in Egypt work with interest. We will let them be, but we will also create sharī‘ah-compliant banks.

JC: Fine, but this is not my question exactly. Let the people choose their policy. But what if a Muslim wants to argue in terms of sharī‘ah that interest is allowable? Shaykh al-Azhar did this in terms of Mubarak’s policies. Maybe he was wrong, but can he not argue this way and differ in terms of sharī‘ah? And if so, who rules?

HAF: In terms of Shaykh al-Azhar, we must return to a situation where he is chosen by his peers and not appointed by the president, so that he does not become subservient to politics.

JC: You are justifying your position here, but you are just a person.

HAF: No, this is the position of everyone. It is textual in sharī‘ah, interest may not be taken from a loan. Many speak about interest being too high, and how we must lower it. But why should you lower it when it shouldn’t be there originally? Isn’t God the one who knows what is best for humanity?

We reject a religious state. Why? A religious state is one where the ruler states that what he decides is from God. No. We want a civil state which is ruled by sharī‘ah. If the ruler makes an error we declare his error, and if he is correct, we say thank you and accept it.

The religious state, as the media makes out that we believe in, is the equivalent of Europe in the Middle Ages where the church ruled by God’s law and there was no room for discussion. The church ruled as if it was in the place of God.

We say we are not in the place of God on earth. No, we present the law of God, and we implement the law of God, but not with haughtiness or pride.

JC: So if the parliament passes a law that violates sharī‘ah…

HAF: We will say no.

JC: But whose word prevails? Who decides?

HAF: If the majority is now Islamic, should not the will of the majority prevail?

You are a Christian, and you will raise your children to be Christian. I, likewise, am a Muslim and do the same. But if we take someone like the liberal ‘Amr Hamzāwī, who says I will let my children choose their faith… Do the traditions of Egypt allow someone to do this?

There must be preservation of the identity of Egypt. You are an American and you have your customs, but is it acceptable to implement your customs on the people of Egypt?

If we look at the spread of AIDS in the world, is it greater among liberal countries, or among those who preserve their cultural heritage and respect religion?

JC: Laws can protect religion, but at the same time, cultures and peoples change. Perhaps you will make a constitution that establishes a civil state ruled by sharī‘ah. It is the role of the courts to judge laws according to the constitution. If the parliament makes a law that some believe violate the sharī‘ah, will the judge rule against it?

HAF: If any project in Egypt violates the sharī‘ah, I will oppose it, and I expect the whole party will as well.

JC: But if your legislative power isn’t enough to oppose?

HAF: We will do our best. But if a matter transgresses the will of the majority, we not accept it. But we respect freedom in everything except that which is against the established principles of religion. And we respect all minorities.

JC: This issue leads to the last, and most important, question: Why should a Copt vote for the Nour Party?

HAF: Today in a conference someone asked me if we would be like previous parliament members, or if we would work for the interest of Muslims.

I told him I consider myself a candidate for Christians, before I represent Muslims, even if they don’t give me their vote. If I am selected for a seat, I represent the district, not just those who vote for me. This is democracy, and it is also sharī‘ah. I will treat the Christian like the Muslim, and in fact be sure to be responsible for them.

While campaigning someone approached me and said, ‘I am a Christian, but by God I will vote for you. You are a respectable and just man.’ I didn’t know who he was, but he had been involved in a reconciliation meeting in which I honored his rights.

I have spoken with Copts in all sincerity. I can be found in the mosque, but I can also be found in the church. I am confident I will capture their votes greater than any other candidate, even if he is a Christian.

Why? I am not interacting with them as if I seek their votes. Actually, elections are a very recent thing. I have behaved this way with Copts for a long time now. I do not speak of ‘national unity’; I speak about the ‘national fabric’. National unity implies there is a difference between us but we come together to solve it and reconcile. No, I say that Egyptian society – Muslim and Christian – is one fabric. The blood of one is the blood that drips from the other.

JC: Praise God, shaykh. Thank you very much.

For a few weeks now, I have been closely following the fuss surrounding the visit by a delegation from the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) to the Saint Mark Cathedral in the Cairo district of al-'Abbāssīyah in the evening of January 6 under Lt. General Sāmī 'Anān to congratulate Christians on the Coptic Christmas.

Lamīs Yahyá is an Egyptian student living in Germany who is supporting the Egyptian 
student movement for democratization in Egypt. She earlier wrote the investigative report
on the conflict around the building of a Coptic Orthodox Church in Marīnāb, September 30,
2011.

Lamīs Yahyá is an Egyptian student living in Germany who is supporting the Egyptian
student movement for democratization in Egypt. She earlier wrote the investigative report
on the conflict around the building of a Coptic Orthodox Church in Marīnāb, September 30,
2011.
 

 AWR obtained the original text of the Azhar documents for Freedom. Please find it below.

Our November 4 review of Prof. Hans Jansen’s article “Copts” in Hoeiboei, on October 14th led Jansen to write that “Most arguments in defence of Islam are known in The Netherlands for what they are, it makes little sense to repeat these another time. With best wishes, Hans Jansen.” [ In Dutch: De meeste argumenten ter verdediging van de islam zijn in Nederland inmiddels wel al gezien voor wat ze zijn, het heeft weinig zin om die nog eens te laten herhalen. Met vriendelijkegroet, HansJansen.]

Prof. Wolfram Reiss, University of Vienna, responded: “Congratulations, your article is wonderful. I read the biography of Muhammad Jansen wrote. It is awful full of polemics. It is full of destruction of al-Sīrah al-Nabawīyyah, but on the other side, he does not have any other alternative. The summary of Jansen’s work is: Nobody knows anything about Muhammad because everything is wrong in al-Sīrah. Of course there are good critical remarks which should be considered, but on the other side he does not show any other perspective to deal with the biography."

Please read full text here

I. Introduction

“Sovereignty is the quality of having supreme, independent authority over a geographic area. It can be found in a power to rule and make law that rests on a political fact for which no purely legal explanation can be provided.”

The challenge Egypt took to get control over NGOs that now operate without proper government licenses within Egypt’s sovereign borders is based on definition of sovereignty.

There were always links between international governmental organizations NGOs and respect for state sovereignty. NGO funding comes from abroad and that sometimes challenges the sovereignty of the nation and raises important legal issues when external funding aims to change social structure and cultural traditions which are very dangerous. The central issue is respect for Egypt sovereignty.

The original full text of the article

Previously, I have written in Arab-West Report about people who have influenced me, such as former Dutch Consul-General to Saudi Arabia, Daniel van der Meulen (1894–1989), who stimulated my interest in the Arab world and Muslim-Christian relations. Syrian-Orthodox Bishop, Samuel Aktash of the Tur Abdin in Turkey showed me in the mid-eighties the damage caused by oriental Christians leaving their homelands, a theme repeated by HRH Prince Hassan bin-Talal in an interview he gave me in 2008 for Christianity Today. Also, Dr. Otto F.A. Meinardus (1925–2005), Egyptian thinker Dr. William Qilada (1924–1999), and Bishop Athanasius, Metropolitan of Beni Suef (1923–2000) influenced my outlook on Coptic Christianity and traditions. In this article I would like to highlight the life of Mrs. Helene Marie van der Meulen-Duhm, widow of Daniel van der Meulen. I much appreciate that Prof. Bernd van der Meulen, looked at the draft text and added information for this article.