2. Disappearing Christianity in the Middle East; Transcript of a lecture at the American University in Cairo

Publishers

Year: 
2006
Week: 
48
Article number: 
2
Date of source: 
17-11-2006
Author: 
William Dalrymple
Article summary: 

Transcript of a speech presented by William Dalrymple at the American

University in Cairo, highlighting his experiences traveling to Christian Holy sites throughout the Middle

East, as

well as his personal interpretation of political Islām. He includes references to both historical

and present day

political developments, and the relations between Muslims and Christians in the Middle

East. The text in AWR is

introduced by Drs. Cornelis Hulsman.

Article full text: 

Transcriber: Susan Richards-Benson,

Edited and introduced by Drs.

Cornelis Hulsman

Introduction by Drs. Cornelis Hulsman:

On

November 17, I attended a most

important lecture by famous British journalist and author William Dalrymple

at the American University in Cairo.

Dalrymple traveled in 1994 to various Christian communities in

Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine, and

Egypt, and discovered that Christianity is expected to

disappear from most of these countries. Dalrymple’s

conclusions are very different from, for example, the

British makers of the film ‘Between Fear and Faith,’ who

traveled in Egypt during the same time. The makers

of this film falsely concocted persecution stories, playing into

pre-existing Western stereotypes and fear

of Islām. In 1994, I spoke with the makers of this film, and they told

me that they wanted a film that

would attract attention, would thus sell and be financially attractive. Dalrymple,

however, wanted to

collect the facts for a travel book, one of the best ever written on contemporary Arab

Christianity.

One hundred years ago Christians still made up some 25% of the population of the

Levant.

Istanbul had a Christian population of nearly 60%. Today their numbers are very small. Dalrymple

searched for the

reasons; various forms of Western interference resulting in tensions in countries in the

Middle East making

Christians emigrate to the economically wealthier West. Dalrymple, however, thought in

1994, just as so many other

Europeans, that the picture was one of Islamic extremism against Christianity

but then saw this was far from

accurate:

Christians in Turkey became the victims of various

nationalisms; Christians in South-Eastern

Turkey were caught in the 1980’s and 1990’s in a civil war

between Kurds and the Turkish government. The civil war

in Lebanon resulted in mass Christian emigration.

In both countries it was not primarily an issue of Islām against

Christianity. Religion certainly has been

misused by some people but it certainly was not the main reason for the

problems Christians have

experienced.

Since the American led invasion in Iraq in 2003, approximately half of

Iraqi’s

Christians have fled the country, most of them to Syria which is tolerant toward its Christian minority,

but, says Dalrymple, if the U.S. were to topple the Syrian regime it would probably be the end of

Christianity in

this country.

Of all regions in the Middle East, the situation of Christians in the

Palestinian territories

is worst but that too has little to do with Islām, but with Christians escaping

extremely difficult circumstances.

Of course extremists misusing Islām, who also attack Christians, do

exist, but it would be wrong to blame all or

most difficulties on extremists alone and neglecting or

undervalueing other far more important factors.

The

status of Palestinian Christians in Israel is

currently stable. Christians in Egypt, says Dalrymple, have gone

through a difficult period with extremist

attacks in the 1980’s and 1990’s but whenever tensions happen Christians

tend to leave. Tensions have often

been the result of Western interferences or perceived interferences such as a

generally greater Western

attention for the rights of Christians then the general well-being of people regardless

of their religious

affiliation that in turn has been perceived by Muslims as injust with a possibility of

sentiments

backfiring on local Christians.

Muslims, generally, have been much more tolerant toward their

non-

Muslim minorities then Christians were to theirs in Europe which does not mean that that there has not been

inequality and problems. Islamophobia in Europe is on the rise, also resulting in wrong presentations about

the

position of Christians in the Islamic world, both historically as well as contemporary, portraying

their position

much darker than is justified if one would take the historical context into consideration.

That is why it is so

extremely important that William Dalrymple presents a different view. He did so in his

book entitled, ‘From the

Holy Mountain,’ and continues to do so in his lectures, such as those at the

American University in Cairo, St. John

the Baptist Church in Cairo and Alexandria. We are pleased that

William Dalrymple gave us his permission to place

the texts of his Cairo lectures in AWR.

Sometime

in the early 1140’s a scholar from North Italy made an

arduous crossing over the Alps and the Pyrenees and

eventually arrived in the newly re-conquered Spanish frontier

town of Toledo. There, Gerard of Cremona was

given the position of canon at the Cathedral, formerly the Jama Masjid

or Friday Mosque, which had recently

been seized from the town’s Muslims.

Before the rise of Islām, Toledo

had been the capital city of

Visigothic Spain, and its capture by Alfonso of Castile was an important moment in the

Christian

reconquista of the land known to Islām as al-Andalus. Many of the Muslims of the city had,

however,

chosen to stay on under Castilian rule, and among them was a scholar named Ghalib, the Mozarab. It is not

known how Gerard and Ghalib met and became friends, but soon after Gerard’s arrival the two began to

cooperate on a

series of translations from Toledo’s Arabic library which had survived the looting of the

conquering

Christians.

Gerard and Ghalib’s mode of translation was not one that would be regarded as

ideal by modern

scholars. Ghalib rendered the classical Arabic of the texts into Castilian Spanish which

Gerard then translated on

into Latin. As many of the texts were Greek classics which had themselves arrived

in Arabic via Syriac, there was

much room for error. But the system seems to have worked. In the course of

the next half-century, Ghalib and Gerard

translated no less than 88 Arabic works of astronomy, mathematics,

medicine, philosophy and logic, exactly the

branches of learning which underpinned the great revival of

scholarship in Europe referred to as the Twelfth

Century Renaissance.

Gerard and Ghalib’s

translations were not alone. Other translations from the Arabic

texts during this period filled European

libraries with a richness of learning impossible even to imagine a century

before: editions of editions of

Aristotle, Euclid, Plato and Ptolemy, commentaries by Ibn Sina- known to the

Christian West as Avicenna and

astrological texts by al-Khwarizmi, encyclopedias of astronomy, illustrated accounts

of chess, and guides

to precious stones and their secret medicinal qualities.

It was a crucial but sometimes

forgotten

moment in the development of Western civilization: the revival of mediaeval European learning by a

wholesale transfusion of scholarship from the Islamic world. It was probably through Islamic Spain that

such basic

facets of western civilization as paper, ideas of courtly love, algebra and the abacus passed

into Europe, while

the pointed arch and Greco-Arab (or Unani from the Arabic word for Greek/Ionian)

medicine arrived via Salerno and

Sicily, where the Norman king Roger II (known as the “Baptised Sultan”)

was commissioning the Tunisian scholar al-

Idrisi to produce an encyclopedic work of geography.

Some

scholars go further: Professor George Makdisi, in

an important book published by the Edinburgh University

Press, has argued convincingly for a major Islamic

contribution toward the emergence of the first

universities in the mediaeval West, showing how terms such as having

‘fellows’ holding a ‘chair,’ or

students ‘reading’ a subject and obtaining ‘degrees,’ as well as practices such as

inaugural lectures and

academic robes, can all be traced back to Islamic concepts and practices. Indeed the idea of

a university

in the modern sense – a place of learning where students congregate to study a wide variety of

subjects

under a number of teachers – is generally regarded as an Arab innovation first developed at the al-Azhar

university in Cairo. As Makdisi has demonstrated, it was in cities bordering the Islamic world – Salerno,

Naples,

Bologna, Montpellier and Paris – that first developed universities in Christendom, the idea

spreading northwards

from there.

The tortuous and complex relationship of Western Christendom and

the world of Islām has provoked

a variety of responses from historians. Some such as the great Scottish

medievalist, Sir Steven Runciman, take the

view (as he wrote at the end of his magisterial three volume

‘History of

The Crusades’) that “Our

civilization has grown out of the long sequence of interaction

and fusion between Orient and Occident.”



Runciman believed that the Crusades should be understood

less as an attempt to re-conquer the Christian

heartlands lost to Islām so much as the last of the

Barbarian invasions. The real heirs of Roman civilization were

not the chain-mailed knights of the rural

West, but the sophisticated Byzantines of Constantinople and the

cultivated Arab caliphate of Damascus,

both of whom had preserved the Hellenized urban civilization of the Antique

Mediterranean long after it was

destroyed in Europe.

Others have seen relations between Islām and

Christianity as being basically

adversarial, a long drawn-out conflict between the two rival civilizations of East

and West: as Gibbon

famously observed of the Frankish victory at the Battle of Tours in 732 AD which halted the

Arab advance

into Europe:

“A victorious line of march had been prolonged from the Rock of Gibraltar to the

banks

of the Loire; the repetition of an equal space would have carried the Saracens to the confines of Poland and

the Highlands of Scotland; the Rhine is not more impassable than the Nile or the Euphrates, and the Arabian

fleet

might have sailed into the mouth of the Thames. Perhaps the interpretation of the Qur’ān would now be

taught in the

schools of Oxford, and her pulpits might demonstrate to a circumcised people the sanctity and

truth of the

Revelation of Mahomet.”

Since 9/11, there has been no shortage of takers for this

school of thought, which

sees Islamo-Christian relations in terms of brute confrontation. The cheerleader

of this tendency in America has

been Bernard Lewis and his follower Samuel Huntington, who between them

have come up with the dangerous notion of

the Clash of Civilizations

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samuel_P._Huntington].

Underlying much of Lewis’s

writing is the

assumption that there are two fixed and opposing forces at work in the history of the Mediterranean

world:

on the one hand is European civilization which he envisages as a Judeo-Christian block; and on the other

hand, and quite distinct, is a hostile Islamic world hell-bent on the conquest and conversion of the West.

As he

writes in one influential essay, The Roots of Muslim Rage: “The struggle between these rival

systems has now

lasted some fourteen centuries. It began with the advent of Islām in the seventh century,

and has continued

virtually to the present day. It has consisted of a long series of attacks and

counterattacks, jihads and

crusades, conquests and re-conquests.” It was this essay that contained the

phrase ‘the Clash of Civilizations,’

later borrowed by Samuel Huntington for his controversial Foreign

Affairs article.

Yet the links that

bind Christianity and Islām are so deep and complex that the

intermittent confrontations should perhaps more

accurately be looked upon as a civil war between two

different streams of the same tradition than any essential

clash of civilizations. Despite their

differences, Muslims and Christians have always traded, studied, negotiated

and loved across the porous

frontiers of religious differences. Probe relations between the two civilizations at

any period of history,

and you find that the neat civilizational blocks imagined by writers such as Bernard Lewis

or Samuel

Huntington soon dissolve.

The Prophet Muhammad did not think he was “founding a new religion” so

much as bringing the fullness of divine revelation, partially granted to earlier prophets such as Abraham,

Moses or

Jesus, to the Arabs of the Arabian Peninsula. Islām accepts much of the Old and New Testaments,

and obeys the

Mosaic laws about circumcision and ablutions, while the Qur’ān calls Christians the "nearest

in love" to Muslims,

whom it instructs in Sūra 29 to "dispute not with the People of the Book

[that is, Jews and

Christians] save in the most courteous manner… and say, ‘We believe in what has been

sent down to us and what has

been sent down to you; our God and your God is one, and to him we have

surrendered’.”

When the early

Byzantines were first confronted by the Prophet’s armies, they

assumed that Islām was merely a variant form of

Christianity, and in some ways they were not so far wrong.

Islam, of course, accepts much of the Old and New

Testaments, obeys the Mosaic laws about circumcision and

ablutions, and venerates both Jesus and the ancient Jewish

prophets. Indeed, the greatest theologian of

the early church, St John of Damascus (d. 749), was convinced that

Islam was at root not a new religion,

but a variation of a Judaeo-Christian form. This perception is particularly

remarkable, as St John had

grown up as a young Arab aristocrat in the Ummayad Arab court of Damascus – the hub of

the young Islamic

world – where his Orthodox Christian father was the Chancellor. St John was himself an intimate

boyhood

friend of the future Caliph al-Yazid, and the two boys’ drinking bouts in the streets of Damascus were

the subject of much gossip in the capital. Later, in his old age, St John took the habit at the desert

monastery

of Mar Saba’ where he began work on his great masterpiece, ‘The Fountain of Knowledge.’ The book

contains an

extremely precise critique of Islām, the first ever written by a Christian, which,

intriguingly, John regarded as a

form of Christianity and closely related to the heterodox Christian

doctrine of Nestorianism. This was a kinship

that both the Muslims and the Christians were aware of. In

649 the Nestorian Christian Patriarch wrote: "These

Arabs fight not against our Christian religion; nay,

rather they defend our faith, they revere our priests and

saints, and they make gifts to our churches and

monasteries." This tradition continued and led to many surprising

anomalies; Saladin’s private

secretary and the head of his war office were both Coptic Christians, as were the

Egyptian commanders who

defeated the Seventh Crusade in 1250.

Throughout the mediaeval period, Christians

and Muslims

continued to meet as much in the context of trade and scholarship as they did on the battlefield. The

tolerant and pluralistic civilization of Muslim Spain allowed a particularly fruitful interaction. A

revealing

moment was when, in 949, a Byzantine embassy presented the court of Cordoba with the works of the

Greek physician

Dioscorides. There were no scholars in Spain who knew Greek, so an appeal was sent back to

Constantinople. In

answer to their request a learned Greek monk named Nicholas was sent to Spain in 951. A

Muslim scholar from Sicily

with a knowledge of Greek was also found. Together these two expounded the text

to a group of Spanish scholars.

This group was a most interesting one. It included native Andalusian

Islamic scholars such as Ibn Juljul, who later

composed a commentary on Dioscorides; a distinguished Jewish

physician and courtier, Hasday ibn Shaprut; and a

Mozarabic bishop Recemund of Elvira who had been sent as

the Caliph’s ambassador to the German Emperor Otto I. It

was a truly international and interdenominational

gathering of scholars.

Throughout the Crusades, the

Venetians and other Italian trading cities kept

up a profitable trade with their Muslim counterparts, resulting in

a great many Arabic words surviving in

Venetian dialect and a profound Islamic influence on Venetian architecture.

Even Christian clerics who

cohabited with Muslims in the Crusader kingdoms came to realize that as much bound them

together as

separated them. As William of Tripoli reported from Acre in 1272: “Though their beliefs are decorated

with

fictions, yet it now manifestly appears that they are near to the Christian faith and not far from the path of

salvation.” At the same time the Muslim traveler Ibn Jubayr noted that despite the military struggles for

control

of Palestine, “Muslims and Christian travelers will come and go between them without

interference.”

There

were, of course, no shortage of travelers on both sides who could see no good

in the infidels amongst whom they

were obliged to mingle, and tensions often existed between Muslim rulers

and the diverse religious communities

living under their capricious thumb: by modern standards Christians

and Jews under Muslim rule- the dhimmi-

were treated as second-class citizens. But there was at

least a kind of pluralist equilibrium (what Spanish

historians have called convivencia or ‘living

together’), which had no parallel in Christendom and which in

Spain was soon lost after the completion of

the Christian reconquista. Upon taking Grenada, the Catholic

Kings expelled the Moors and Jews, and

let loose the Inquisition on those – the New Christians – who had converted.

There was a similar pattern in

Sicily. After a fruitful period of tolerant coexistence under the Norman kings, the

Muslims were later

given a blunt choice of transportation or conversion.

Ten years ago I made a journey

through the

Christian communities of the Middle East which had survived 1400 years of Muslim rule, in sharp

contrast to

the Muslim communities conquered by Christian rulers. The journey finally appeared in print as ‘From

the

Holy Mountain.’ I had started the book expecting to record a tale of persecution of Christian minorities by

Islamic fundamentalists, but the longer I spent among Middle Eastern Christians, the more I became aware

that in

many ways the opposite story was more remarkable: the extraordinary degree of tolerance of Muslim

rulers relative

to their counterparts in the Christian West.

This was not a new observation. The

more I read I found that

the tolerance of Muslim rulers was something which had long struck European

visitors to the Mughul and Ottoman. As

Monsieur de la Motraye, a Huguenot exile escaping religious

persecution in Europe put it: "There is no country on

earth where the exercise of all religions is freer

and less subject to being troubled than in Turkey." At the same

time that most of Catholic Europe was given

over to the Inquisition, and in Rome Giordano Bruno was burnt for

heresy at the stake in the Campo dei

Fiori in India, the sixteenth century Mughal Emperor Akbar declared that "No

man should be interfered with

on account of religion, and anyone is to be allowed to go over to a religion that

pleases him.”

On

my journey among the Middle Eastern Christians I was also struck by the extent to which

eastern Christian

practice formed the template for the basic conventions of Islām: the Muslim form of prayer with

its bowings

and prostrations appears to derive from the older Syrian Orthodox tradition still practiced in pew less

churches across the Levant. The architecture of the earliest minarets, square rather than round, derive

from the

church towers of Byzantine Syria; and Ramaḍān, at first sight one of the most distinctive Islamic

practices, is

nothing more than an Islamicization of Lent, which in eastern Christian churches still

involves a grueling all-day

fast. Certainly, if a monk from sixth-century Byzantium were to come back

today, he would find much more that was

familiar in the practices and beliefs of a modern Muslim Ṣūfī than

in, say, a contemporary American Evangelical.

Yet this simple truth has been lost by our tendency to think

of Christianity as thoroughly Western, rather than the

Oriental faith that it actually is.

* *

*

In the decade since finishing ‘From the Holy Mountain,’ I

have continued writing about the

relationship of Christianity and Islām, but from a slightly different angle of the

18th and

19th century history of early colonial India, a period like that of 8th

century

Islamic Spain when East and West did again most certainly meet.

In ‘White Mughals,’ I wrote about

the often forgotten period in the 18th century India when East and West most certainly did meet. For in the

early

days of the East India Company during the 18th century, it was almost as common for westerners to

take on the

customs, and even the religions, of India, as the reverse.




These White Mughals had responded

to their travels in

India by shedding their Britishness like an unwanted skin, and adopting Indian dress,

studying Indian philosophy,

studying Islamic astrology, marrying Muslim wives and adopting the ways of the

Mughal governing class they came to

replace what Salman Rushdie, talking of modern multiculturalism, has

called ‘chutnification.’




Moreover, the White

Mughals were far from an insignificant minority: by the end

of the 18th century fully one-third of the British men

in India were leaving their possessions to Indian

wives.


In Delhi the period was symbolized by Sir David

Ochterlony, the British resident who arrived in

the city in 1803: every evening, all 13 of his Indian wives went

around Delhi in a procession behind their

husband, each on the back of her own elephant.



For all the humor of

this image, in such mixed households,

Islamic customs and sensitivities were clearly understood and respected. In

one letter, for example, it is

recorded that ’Lady Ochterlony has applied for leave to make the Hadge to

Mecca.’

One of

the most moving of Ochterlony’s letters concerns his two daughters, and the

question of whether he

should bring them up as Muslim or Christian, If Christian, they would be constantly derided

for their "dark

blood," but Ochterlony also hesitated to bring them up as Muslims "as I own I could not bear that

one of my

daughters should be part of a numerous Ḥarīm." A letter, written to another Scot in a similar position,

who

has opted to bring up his children as Muslim Indians, ends rather movingly: "In short my dear M[ajor] I have

spent all the time since we were parted in revolving this matter in mind but I have not yet been able to

come to a

positive decision."

This was not an era when notions of clashing civilizations would have

made sense to

anyone. The world inhabited by Ochterlony was far more hybrid, and had far less clearly

defined ethnic, national

and religious borders, than we have all been conditioned to expect.



It is

certainly unfamiliar to anyone who

accepts at face value the usual caricature of the Englishman in India,

presented over and over again in films and

television dramas, of the narrow-minded sahib in a sola topee,

dressing for dinner in the jungle. My most recent

book, ‘The Last Mughal,’ continues the story, by

looking at what happened next – why the surprisingly easy

relationship of Islām and Christianity seen in

the 18th century India collapsed so quickly, and why the

relatively easy inter-racial and inter

-religious relationships, so evident during the time of Ochterlony, gave way

to the hatreds and racism of

the high 19th century Raj: how a close clasp of two civilizations turned into a bitter

clash.




Two things

in particular seem to have put paid to this easy co-existence. One was the rise of British

power. In a few

years the British had defeated not only the French but also all their Indian rivals; and in a

manner not

unlike the Americans after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the change in the balance of power quickly led

to

an attitude of undisguised imperial arrogance.



No longer was the West prepared to study and learn from the

subcontinent; instead Macaulay came to speak for a whole generation of Englishmen when he declared his view

that "A

single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia."



The other

factor was the ascendancy of Evangelical Christianity, and the profound change in social,

sexual and racial

attitudes that this brought about.



The wills written by dying East India Company

servants show that the practice

of cohabiting with Indian bibis quickly began to decline: from turning up

in one-in-three wills between 1780 and

1785, they are present in only one-in-four between 1805 and 1810. By

1830, it is one-in-six; by the middle of the

century, they have all but disappeared.


In half a century, a

surprisingly multicultural world refracted back into

its component parts, while the children of mixed race

were corralled into what became effectively a new Indian

cast, the Anglo-Indians who were left to run the

railways, posts and mines.



Like today, this process of pulling

apart, of failing to talk, listen or trust

each other took place against the background of an increasingly

aggressive and self-righteous West, facing

ever stiffer resistance to Western interference.



For, as anyone who

has ever studied the story of the

rise of the British in India will know well, there is nothing new about the Neo-

Cons. The old game of

regime change of installing puppet regimes, propped up by the West for its own political and

economic ends

is a game that the British had well mastered by the late 18th century.



Sometimes the parallels are

almost

uncanny. By the end of the 1990’s, the hardliners in London, who were calling for regime change, found that

they now had a president who was not prepared to wait to be attacked: he was a new sort of conservative,

aggressive

in foreign policy, bitterly anti-French, and intent on turning his country into the unrivalled

global power.




It

was best, he believed, simply to remove a hostile Muslim regime that presumed to resist

the West. The first to be

targeted was a Muslim dictator who had usurped power in a military coup.

According to British sources, this leader

of state was a "furious fanatic," who had "perpetually on his

tongue the projects of Jihād." He was also deemed to

be "oppressive and unjust, [and a] perfidious

negotiator."



It was, in short, time to take out Tipu Sulṭān of

Mysore, and the president of the Board of

Control, Henry Dundas, sent Richard Wellesley, elder brother of the Iron

Duke, to India in 1798 with

instructions to replace Tipu with a western-backed puppet. First, however, Wellesley

had to justify to the

British public a policy whose outcome had already been long decided in private. Wellesley,

therefore,

began a campaign of vilification against Tipu, portraying him as an aggressive Muslim, a view strongly

disputed by many modern historians who tend to see him instead as a modernizing technocrat. Tipu was duly

invaded

and killed in the lucrative war of 1799.



By the 1850s the British had progressed from

aggressively removing

independent-minded Muslim rulers, such as Tipu Sulṭān who refused to bow before the

will of the hyper-power, to

destabilizing, then annexing even the most pliant Muslim states. By this time,

many British officials were nursing

dreams to impose not only British laws and technology on India, but

also British values, in the form of

Christianity.


If the missionaries reinforced Muslim fears, increasing

opposition to British rule and creating a

constituency for the rapidly multiplying jihadis, so the

existence of "Wahhābī Conspiracies" strengthened the

conviction of the Evangelicals that a "strong attack"

was needed to take on such "Muslim fanatics."

Today,

West and East again face each other uneasily

across a divide that many see as religious war. Suicide jihadis fight

what they see as a defensive action

against their Christian enemies, and again innocent civilians are slaughtered.



As before, western

Evangelical politicians are apt to cast their opponents and enemies in the role of "incarnate

fiends" and

simplistically conflate armed resistance to invasion and occupation with "pure evil." Again western

countries, blind to the effect their foreign policies have on the wider world, feel aggrieved and surprised

to be

attacked as they see it by mindless fanatics.



As we have seen in our own time, the histories of

Islamic

fundamentalism and western imperialism have often been closely, and dangerously, intertwined. In a

curious but

concrete way, extremists and fundamentalists of both faiths have needed each other to reinforce

each other’s

prejudices and hatreds.


The venom of one provides the lifeblood of the other. There are

clear lessons here. For,

in the celebrated words of Edmund Burke, himself a fierce critic of British

aggression in India, those who fail to

learn from history are always destined to repeat it.

* *

*

Since 9/11 there has rightly been a great

deal of scrutiny of the failings of the Muslim world:

much has been written about the absence of freedom and a

civil society in almost all Muslim countries, as

well as the failure of Muslim elites to bring either mass

education or economic prosperity to their people.

There has also been much pertinent questioning as to why so many

of the world’s conflicts, and so much of

its terrorism, are associated with Islamist groups.

There has also

been a great deal of reflection

on the difference between the tolerant pluralistic intellectual past of Islām and

its often intolerant

present. In this respect I would recommend to you a fine essay, entitled, ‘In the Court of the

Lions I Sat

Down and Wept,’ by Lebanese novelist Hanan al-Shaykh. al-Shaykh writes about her feelings on visiting

the

Alhambra and her depression in feeling that:

“We Arabs have no connection with the Arabs of Andalucia,

with those who, having borrowed the pens and chisels of angels, have carved and embellished to such

melodious

perfection…

“Why is it,” she asks, “that we didn’t complete our cultural journey, and how

is it that we have

ended up today in the very worst of times? What is it that made our predecessors pore

over their desks, writing

down and recording the marvels of mathematics and science and searching out the

skies with the stars and

constellations in order to discover their secrets, and, driven by the love of

knowledge, to study medicine and to

devise medicaments even from the stomach of bees. It is enough for us

to mention the works of al-Farabi, Avicenna,

Ibn Khaldun, Ibn Rushd, Ziryab, Ibn Hazm, Ibn Zeydoun and

countless others.”

This soul searching, which has

taken place both within the Islamic world and

amongst the wider Muslim Diaspora, has been for the good. Few Muslims

would now dispute that much has gone

badly wrong with contemporary Islām, particularly with the way that the Saudis

have used their petrodollars

to spread around their particularly narrow and intolerant Wahhābī brand of

Islam.

But at the moment,

in the aftermath of the horrors in Abū Ghraib and Guatanamo Bay and the entirely

avoidable massacres of

ordinary Iraqi civilians in Falluja and elsewhere, it is highly debatable whether it is now

the moment for

putting only the Arab world on the psychiatrist’s couch. Surely, at this point, it is us in the West

who

should be engaged in some introspection?

For what Abū Graib has shown yet again is the continuing

tendency of the imperial Christian West to treat “the other” as untermenchen - subhuman. Racism is

not

static: its targets change. For much of the history of Christendom it was the Jews who suffered the

brunt of

European bigotry. But it is increasingly apparent that just as Islām is now replacing Judaism as

Europe’s second

religion, so Islamophobia is replacing anti-Semitism as the principal Western statement of

bigotry.

Last

year, on a lecture tour in the States, I came across the full force of Middle American

views on Muslims. The only

language they understand is force, my Detroit taxi driver assured me: “This

liberal whining is because the U.S. is

being too soft on those Camel Jockeys.” He went on to tell a joke

how Muslims came in two varieties: push buttons

(a reference, apparently, to Hindu women’s bindis) and pull

starters (a reference to turbans), before reminding me

that after all, it was Saddam who was responsible

for 9/11. Earlier in the summer, following the beheading of the

kidnapped American Nick Berg, Rush Limbaugh

went on air to reassure Middle America that “They are the ones who are

perverted. They are the ones who are

dangerous. They are the ones who are subhuman. They are the ones who are human

debris, not the United

States of America and not our soldiers and not our prison guards.”

Nor do we in

Britain have any

right to sneer at America. When Limbaugh’s British counterpart, Kilroy-Silk, was sacked for

writing that

the Arabs were little more than “loathsome” “suicide bombers, limb amputators and women repressors,”

97% of

callers to the Express – about 22,000 people – agreed that the BBC had been too harsh with him. It is

still clearly acceptable to people in this country to make the sort of racist asides about Arabs and

Muslims that

would now be considered quite unacceptable if made about Jews, Catholics or Black people.

Consider this letter I

received a couple of months back from William Roff, who was formerly professor of

History at Columbia University in

New York, and has now retired to Edinburgh where he supervises students

in Islamic and Middle Eastern studies. This

is what he wrote:

“Within the past few years, four of my

Malaysian students have been subjected to racist

violence directed against them as "Pakis" or Arabs (and

Muslims). One had emerged from Friday prayers at a mosque

in Dundee when he was hit in the face by a stone

and nearly lost an eye. Another, living in a village with his

young family, had obscene graffiti scrawled

on the house and excrement pushed through the letter box. A third lived

with his wife and young children on

an Edinburgh housing scheme, where they were so harassed by vituperation and

threats of violence that they

were forced to move into central Edinburgh, at a much higher rent which required him

to take a job and

prevented him completing his thesis. The fourth, a month or so ago, returned to Edinburgh from

fieldwork

with his wife, a toddler and a baby, and had a brick thrown through the bedroom window.



“Such incidents

testify to a culture of active racism in Britain that is the product of levels of ignorance inadequately

addressed

by educational authorities and fostered by the sneering, casual racism of much of the tabloid

press.”

After

the bombs in the London tube, and the discovery of other plots to wreak havoc, Muslims

in Britain are now used to

endless suspicion, and occasional abuse, discrimination and violence, and little

of which gets reported. The

massacre of 8,000 Muslims at Srebrenica in 1995, never led to articles about

the violence of Christianity. Yet

every abominable act of al-Qaeda terrorism brings to the surface a great

raft of criticism of Islām as a religion,

and dark mutterings about the sympathies of Western Muslims –

even from the Anglican Archbishops. Meanwhile British

Muslims remain firmly on the margins of our national

life. Considering the size of our Muslim community it is

scandalous that there are only four Muslim schools

in the state sector. It is even more alarming that there are

only four Muslim peers, two Muslim MPs and a

single lonely British Muslim MEP. One of Tony Blair’s most senior

Downing Street advisers recently told me

that Labour did not take Muslim sentiment seriously, as there was yet to

emerge a serious Muslim lobby

capable of reacting in a political coherent manner.

Of course this sort of

thing is not just a

British problem. In the U.S. we have recently had Congressional candidates comparing Arabs to

“pond scum,”

and while in France Le Pen may rail against Muslim North African immigrants and howl for their mass

repatriation, his outbursts look positively benign beside those of the late Rabbi Meir Kahane in Israel

("The Arabs

are a cancer, cancer, cancer in the midst of us... let me become defense minister for two

months and you will not

have a single cockroach around here! I promise you a clean Israel!") or indeed

those of Bal Thackeray in Bombay ("I

believe in constructive violence... these people must be kicked out.

Even if a Hindu is giving shelter to these

Muslims he also must be shot dead").

Yet perhaps the most

worrying thing about this trend is the extent to

which it has gone largely unrecognized and uncriticized:

indeed despite centuries of prejudice and violence against

Muslims, the term Islamophobia was only coined

within the last decade. Moreover intellectualized versions of this

anti-Islamic revulsion have come to find

acceptance in defense and political circles: not long ago, Nato’s

then secretary-general, Willy Claes,

told the German daily Suddeutsche Zeitung that "Islamic fundamentalism

is just as much a threat to

the West as Communism was," going on to contrast barbaric Islām with "The basic

principles of civilization

that bind North America and Western Europe."

Meanwhile, in Washington, despite

the Democrat victory

in the mid term elections, there is still talk blithely of moving on next year from Iraq to

attack Iran and

Syria. To add petrol to the flames, they then invite Franklin Graham, the Christian evangelist who

has

branded Islām a ’very wicked and evil’ religion (Christianity and Islām, he writes, are “as different

as lightness and darkness”) to be the official speaker at the Pentagon’s annual service - and this

immediately

prior to Graham’s departure to Iraq to attempt converting the people of Baghdad to

Christianity.

All

the while, the paranoia and bottled-up rage in the Muslim world grows more

uncontrollable, queues of angry young

men volunteer for suicide bombings and attacks by Islamic militants

gather pace, with ever wider global reach and

technical sophistication. No wonder we feel scared.

It

is clear we will never win the war on Islamist

terrorism until we win the battle for Muslim hearts and

minds. It is decent, moderate Muslim opinion – not torture

chambers – that is our best defense against the

spread of Islamist radicalism, yet at the moment we seem to be

doing all we can to persuade the people of

the Middle East that we are all hypocrites, sadists and liars. In one

summer, the abuses of Abū Ghraib,

the mass murders of Iraqis in Faluja combined with the continuing betrayal of the

Palestinians by Bush and

Blair, allowing illegal settlers to annex great junks of the West Bank, has succeeded in

inflaming even the

most moderate Muslim opinion. The sad truth is that the Islamic World is now united against us

more

forcefully than at any time since Suez. Unless we change our ways, its not just Iraq that we stand to lose,

it’s the entire war against Militant Islamist ultra-radicalism. Bin Laden must be delighted.

* * *

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