No one had expected Thursday’s crackdown on several Egyptian NGOs for allegedly receiving unauthorized foreign financial support. Neither did anyone suspect that the ultra-conservative Salafī political groups would make such substantial electoral gains in Egypt. Are these somehow connected to a strategic play for power in the upper echelons of Egyptian authority?
Weeks before the first commemoration of the January 25th revolution, virtually no one - inside or outside of Egypt - is able to make sense of its cronically complicated political scene. News reporting in the past weeks has been focused on the ongoing elections and this month’s brutal evacuation of demonstrators in front of the parliament and cabinet. The final phase of elections is set to begin next week. The results of all phases in these elections need careful analysis. It was expected that the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party would do well at the polls. This would have also been the case if fair and transparent elections were held 10 years earlier. Unexpected, however, is the striking ascendance of the Salafīs, ultra conservative Muslims, who are divided in four political parties, the biggest of which is the al-Nūr (light) Party. The most conservative is al-Asālah, whose secretary-general recently refused to extend Christmas greetings to Christians, blaming “a psychological obstacle” prevents him from doing so.
I am skeptical about the surpisingly high percentage of voters for Salafī parties. Was the high Salafī turnout meant to counter the influence of the Freedom and Justice Party? And was this result desired by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, whose 19 generals are now seen and quoted in all of the media as insisting on playing a political role that is “appropriate” for the army?
On Thursday, we witnessed the mind-boggling police raid of 19 human rights offices in Egypt. Even the well-known Konrad Adenaur Stiftung in Cairo was exposed to the same illogical brutality, although the organization had a long cooperation with the former Mubarak regime.
There is a long history of Egyptians being sensitive to foreign interference through support for Egyptian NGOs, but the attack we have seen now was unprecendented.
The media seems to be justifying these attacks by saying these offices have received foreign funding, provoked society and thus work towards destabilizing the country. But I believe the same question must be asked about the financial support that Salafīs receive from foreign sources, as least before the elections. I believe there should have been transparancy in who is financing any election campaign. But the lack of such transparancy and the selective clampdown on NGOs indicate that the SCAF is abusing its power against any voice of the opposition, silencing them and discrediting their image in Egyptian media. These are methods that were commonly used during the Mubārak days, and may even be worse.
On December 22, al-Badīl published an interesting report about the sources of Salafī funding. There is a list of all NGOs who receive foreign funding but have a look at the amount of money that Salafīs receive. Sources from Qatar supported the Ansār al-Sunnah, a powerhouse of the Salafīs, with 182 million Egyptian pounds. The same organization received 141 million Egyptian Pounds from Kuwait! This is at least 300 million to Salafīs and their offices that has not been touched until now. What is the supposed role that Salafīs should play at this moment?
Many questions must be asked here. Do these facts indicate an agreement between Salafīs and the SCAF, or does the SCAF use the Salafīs for their own benefit? Will this result in Salafī political support for decisions made by the SCAF, legitimizing them and supporting them in the poorest districts in Egypt where Salafī activities are mostly flourishing? That would be similar to the previous arrangement of silent support that Salafīs have given to the Mubārak regime.
I fear the SCAF may use the Salafīs, or even the old Jihad organization, as an excuse to violently crackdown on the young revolutionaries at Tahrīr, but I hope that I am wrong.
